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FOREWORD
WHITHER THE LEGAL WHALE:
INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND THE
SOCIALIZATION OF
PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY
Randy Frances Kandel *
'The time has come,' the Walrus said,
'To talk of many things: Of shoes-and ships-and sealing-wax-
Of cabbages-and Kings.... "
I. AN OPENING METAPHOR
"We live in and by the law."2 So begins the preface to Ronald
Dworkin's award-winning book, Law's Empire. Professor Dworkin's
words no doubt resonate with many, if not most, legal scholars and prac-
titioners who perceive law as occupying a central role in human experi-
ence and the social order. It is perpetually problematic, however,
whether Professor Dworkin's words ring true and familiar because law
is, in some objective way, the structural skeleton of society or whether
the perception of law comes from our more personal condition. Having
been educated, indoctrinated, and initiated into our professional legal
identity, the law has been injected into us and we into it. To look at
ourselves is to see law; to look at the world is to see through legal lenses.
Like Jonah-or perhaps more accurately Geppeto-we are inside
the legal beast.3 We are both its slaves and its masters, having learned
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola of Los Angeles Law School; J.D., 1982, New York
University School of Law; Ph.D., 1975, City University of New York; B.A., 1966, University
of Wisconsin.
1. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 78 (St. Martin's Press 1977)
(1871).
2. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE at vii (1986).
3. From the insider's view, perceptions of reality are emotion laden-often making it
difficult to disentangle cause and effect. In 1981, with Norman Mailer's help, Jack Henry
Abbott published In the Belly of the Beast: Letters from Prison. The book documented the
violent and paranoid lifestyle inculcated by an upbringing and life spent in the juvenile and
adult prison systems. The book's success led to Abbott's release from prison. But the author's
career ended sadly when Abbott killed a man on New York's Lower East Side-apparently
misreading the man's innocent gestures for an attempt to attack him. This tragedy called into
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the professional techniques to tickle its soft belly from within to make it
move in the directions we select. But ironically, we remain masters only
so long as we also remain slaves. When we are disgorged and adrift-
both free and naked of the manipulative and commanding power of our
professional identity-we begin to see and sense the shape, power, and
position of the legal whale and its course in the greater sea of society.
It is therefore with great joy that I introduce a volume that aids the
ongoing task of decentralizing law from its self-perceived place at the
axis of the social order. The ten invited Essays in this Symposium,
Reweaving the Seamless Web: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Law,
represent contributions from leading scholars: Professors Alexander
Morgan Capron and Vicki Michel on law and bioethics, Professors John
M. Conley and William M. O'Barr on law and anthropology, Professor
Leslie Pickering Francis on law and philosophy, Professor Frank Mun-
ger on law and sociology, Professor Randal Picker on law and econom-
ics, Professor R. Randall Rainey, S.J., on law and religion, Professor
John Phillip Reid on law and history, Professor Carol Sanger on law and
feminism, Professor Peter Meijes Tiersma on law and language, and Pro-
fessor Richard H. Weisberg on law and literature.
The authors were given two tasks. First, they were asked to discuss
the significant challenges and achievements of working in their respective
interdisciplinary fields. Second, they were asked to explain a few of their
fields' key concepts, those that might be useful to legal scholars who are
nonspecialists.
This Symposium is intended to achieve multiple goals. First, despite
the interdisciplinary trend of the 1990s, the status of the interdisciplines
is still often perceived as peripheral to the study of law-as the conjunc-
tive quality of the common "law and . . ." designation evidences. In
bringing together under one cover a kaleidoscope of overlapping essays,
we hope to help push the interdisciplines further towards the center of
legal academia, thus challenging the centrality in which lawyers hold the
law. Second, this Symposium is intended to initiate the nonspecialist into
the basic theoretical and methodological approaches of the interdis-
ciplines. Finally, it is intended to further the cross-fertilization among
law and the interdisciplines, in hopes that new and hybrid approaches
will appear.
In striving for these goals, we sought contributions that would be
more than merely informative: We wanted them to be useful to legal
question whether Abbott's paranoid perception was prior to, or the result of, his incarceration
experiences. Are less hostile views of the law less tainted?
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scholars in both their research and their teaching. We therefore chose
authors who not only are interdisciplinary scholars but also are or have
been law teachers in law schools and are sensitive to the unique con-
straints and opportunities of legal academia, including the need to engage
in constructive dialogue with one's colleagues, the desire that one's re-
search and teaching complement each other, and the importance of in-
corporating the interdisciplines into the curriculum in a way that will
remain relevant and memorable to practicing attorneys.
The contributors to this Symposium responded to this challenge in
different ways. Professor Munger, for example, chose to survey the law
and society field with a broad brush. Others concentrated on a single
example of interdisciplinarity-for instance, Professor Weisberg's discus-
sion of the values and limits of considerate communication or Professor
Picker's discussion of the game-theory approach to legal policy. Some,
like Professors Conley and O'Barr and Professors Capron and Michel,
concentrated on the theory of the interdiscipline; others, like Professor
Reid, Professor Francis, and Professor Tiersma, on the use or potential
use of the discipline by lawyers. Still others, like Professor Sanger, have
focused on law teaching, while Professor Rainey criticizes the ideological
barriers between the disciplines of law and religion. What the contribu-
tions have in common is an explanation and analysis of the law according
to some central theoretical or methodological approach that is nondoctri-
nal in nature. Each thus problematizes the centrality of law by looking
at the whale from some other place in the sea of competing paradigms
and world views.
II. CENTRALITY AND THE SOCIALIZATION OF LAWYERS
Much of the sense of centrality that dominates legal thinking comes
from the context in which legal scholars work. Law schools and legal
scholars are separated from colleagues in other disciplines in ways that
create a sense of both specialness and isolation. Perhaps because of a
lingering misconception that law students and law professors are forever
running down to court at odd hours, or perhaps because of a subcon-
scious fear that the practical aspects of legal studies may pollute the pris-
tine abstractions of arts and sciences graduate students, law school
buildings have traditionally been isolated from the mainstream of cam-
pus life-some are literally miles away, others are self-contained systems.
The physical isolation of law schools is both symbolic and causative
of a more profound intellectual separation that affects both faculty and
students. Law students and nonlaw students rarely take classes together
or bump into one another on campus or in the library. Similarly, law
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professors are unlikely to have informal daily encounters with faculty
from other disciplines. When they emerge from their offices to chat, law
professors encounter other law professors: Thus, their professionally
specific ideas and their general intellectual world view develop with more
exclusive intensity towards others of their own kind than is true in the
arts and sciences.
Interdisciplinary cross-fertilization occurs, therefore, in serendipi-
tous fashion. Postmodernism, for example, raged across the scholarly
legal landscape of the 1980s. Similarly, the work of educational psychol-
ogist Carol Gilligan on gender-related differences in moral development'
has become a foundational document of feminist jurisprudence-more
influential on legal scholarship than in the field of psychology. But it has
taken more than a decade for the narrative, interpretive, and phenome-
nological approaches of critical legal studies, critical race theory, and
feminist jurisprudence to reestablish linkages with the comparable par-
ticipant-observation-based ethnographic tradition of anthropology and
the ethnomethodological school of sociology, and to benefit from the the-
ories and insights of those disciplines.'
4. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). For an illustration of how
pervasive Gilligan's influence has been outside of feminist legal studies, see Alexander M.
Capron & Vicki Michel, Law and Bioethics, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 25 (1993). Gilligan's origi-
nal ideas have been expanded into a theory of legal practice that contrasts the ethics of justice
and the ethics of care. As such, it has now been transplanted into bioethics theorizing to
address the issue of whether adversarial rights talk is the appropriate discourse for health care
giver/patient relationships. Despite its continuing vitality in legal discourse, several well-
respected and prominently employed educational psychologists of my acquaintance have either
never read or long forgotten her work.
5. In her contribution to this Symposium, Professor Sanger recognizes the debt that such
feminist methods of research as observation and interviewing owe to the social sciences. See
Carol Sanger, Feminism and Disciplinarity: The Curl of the Petals, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 225
(1993). Much of the earliest feminist jurisprudence, however, seemed to claim that it had
discovered, rather than adopted, these approaches. The claim was curious, since such methods
have characterized research on law by anthropologists and sociologists for more than a cen-
tury-and often for the very same reason of making visible those whom the system ignores.
See John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Legal Anthropology Comes Home: A Brief History
of the Ethnographic Study of Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 41 (1993); Frank Munger, Sociology
of Law for a Postliberal Society, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 89 (1993).
The claim, and the sense of such methods as novel, derives neither from ignorance nor
ego, but rather from the gulf between legal scholars who study sociocultural issues and social
scientists who study legal issues. The sociolegal and legal anthropological approach is now
being applied by law school-based scholars to situations which do not necessarily involve
power-disenfranchised minorities. An excellent theoretical introduction is Richard K.
Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview: What We Talk about When We Talk about Law,
37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 9 (1992). The term "lawyering theory" again illustrates the scope of
semantic appropriation. Given the article's emphasis on law users and nonjudicial contexts,
the approach might better be called "nonlawyering theory."
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Cross-fertilization, in the form of transplanting ideas from other dis-
ciplines to legal scholarship, is sometimes so selective and arbitrary a
process that Randal Picker, for example, describes it as a kind of "intel-
lectual arbitrage"-an investment opportunity that guarantees a positive
payoff in the form of distinguished publications and large numbers of
citations.' Similarly, Professor Reid illustrates the selective and some-
times self-serving uses of history by lawyers and judges.7
The third aspect of separateness is legal professionalism and the pre-
vailing vision of legal education as professional training. The gravamen
of law school is not studying law. It is becoming a lawyer. I suspect that
the diminished use of the classic Socratic method in recent years8 has
made being a law student less brutal to one's self-esteem than it used to
be. Yet, thousands of law students still experience the first year of law
school as an episode of psychic pain in which their identities are shred-
ded and then reshaped into the identities of lawyers.
The rituals of the first year of law school loom like so many life
crisis events on the path from neo-infancy to renewed adolescence. End-
less deconstruction of old thought patterns and experimental construc-
tion of the habits of "thinking like a lawyer" take place informally in
first-year study groups, more publicly where Socratic method is used in
the classroom, most intensively in legal writing assignments, and most
subtly when course materials are compressed into "outlines" in prepara-
tion for final exams.9 Ultimately, the language and logic of the law cut
mental grooves through which perceptions run and form a system of
heuristics for analyzing all experience. 10
6. Randal C. Picker, Law and Economics. Intellectual Arbitrage, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
127 (1993).
7. See John P. Reid, Law and History, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 193 (1993).
8. See Leslie P. Francis, Law and Philosophy: From Skepticism to Value Theory, 27 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 65 (1993).
9. I still remember well the evening of the last day of classes of my first semester in law
school. After a visit to a favorite local bar, at which we all consumed large amounts of beer, I
climbed into the shower. Wondering, with classic first-year anxiety, whether I might slip,
break a leg, and miss my first final, my thoughts suddenly jumped to a tort law analysis of the
situation-duty, breach, and the like. I can still recall the visceral shock as my brain jumped
from the first set of neural pathways to the second, more recently internalized.
10. Linguistics, psychology, and the social sciences converge toward a theory of the rela-
tionship between habits of thought and habits of perception. The Whorf-Sapir hypothesis
posits that language structures perception because of the classification system established by
words and the particular connections embedded in grammatical structures. For a general dis-
cussion of this hypothesis, see Stuart Chase, Foreword to LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REAL-
rrY 1, 26-28 (John B. Carroll ed., 1956).
Psychologists find that certain sets of perceptions, associations, and assumptions formed
through the habits of education and experience are linked together in the deep structure of the
FOREWORD
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In a growing minority of first-year curricula, appellate case opinions
are supplemented by simulated prelitigation practice experiences, lessons
on regulatory and administrative system legal options, and context
courses incorporating humanities and social sciences. Even so, students
must still develop a mastery of the internal logic of common-law prece-
dent-syllogism, analogy, and plain language statutory interpreta-
tionI'-largely without reference to the intellectual and emotional
armory of the diverse perspectives they have developed in their under-
graduate and prelaw lives. When, later on, students are authorized or
empowered to reassert these disciplinary perspectives, they have been
taught to subsume them in argumentative support of the doctrinal logic
of the law. These prelaw perspectives are subordinate to legal thinking,
not analytical approaches of coequal standing. 2
Because the skills of thinking like a lawyer are combined with the
process of being socialized to be a lawyer, lawyers' ways of looking at the
world come to define lawyers and hence to seem central to their experi-
ence. Eventually, through the final initiation rites of bar exams and
swearing in, being a lawyer becomes not merely an identity but a status
and a professional role-a system of ethics and a set of interests. Law-
yers, for the most part, work with and against other lawyers rather than
in teams comprised of people from different specialties. To be a lawyer
and to think like a lawyer is then to live in a world of lawyers.
Legal education is a particularly effective way of creating legal cul-
ture. It employs all of the best methods of socialization-education, ini-
tiation, language, and assumption of professional identity-and a
brain, as heuristics for making conclusions, judgments, and choices. See, e.g., ROBIN M. Ho-
GARTH, JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION (1980).
Anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu speaks of the logic of practice, which might well embrace
legal practice, as involving patterns of strategic responses learned by, and preadapted to, the
practice in which one is engaged. PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 52-65 (1990).
Anthropologist Catherine Lutz theorizes that the combination of cultural training and lan-
guage classification results in the cultural construction of emotion. CATHERINE A. LUTZ,
UNNATURAL EMOTIONS (1989).
11. For a discussion of how plain meaning may not be as plain as it seems, see Peter M.
Tiersma, The Judge as Linguist, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 269 (1993).
12. Whether it is regarded as the heart-or the horror-of legal education, "thinking like
a lawyer" is recognized as something special that distinguishes law from other disciplines; it is
both a goal and a consequence of legal education. See, e.g., Peter Rigby & Peter Sevareid,
Lawyers, Anthropologists, and the Knowledge of Facts, in DOUBLE VISION: ANTHROPOLO-
GISTS AT LAW 5 (Randy Frances Kandel ed., National Ass'n for the Practice of Anthropology
Bulletin No. 11, 1992) (stating that because legal education emphasizes rule of law and reason-
ing by syllogism and analogy, law students have very different view toward facts than do an-
thropology graduate students, whose eclectic empirical training creates heightened awareness
of relationship between fact and theory).
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pervasive liberal ideology that conceives of law as central to the social
order. Because the processes of learning and practicing law, on the one
hand, and of becoming and being a lawyer, on the other, are so intimately
fused, law occupies a central and structural place in both of the two great
traditions that characterize legal scholarship today: the deductive/ana-
lytical and the inductive/interpretive. It is our own socialization that we
carry forward in our research and teaching-whether unconsciously, ac-
ceptingly, or through our critical response.'
While the deductive/analytical tradition has an interdisciplinary di-
mension-some law and economics, some law and philosophy-its back-
bone is classic doctrinal scholarship supplemented by traditional
jurisprudence. Such scholarship focuses on the internal logic of the law,
and the balance of policies and principles that undergird particular posi-
tions. This legal scholarship is essentially the mature application of the
methods of reasoning learned in law school. Regardless of the author's
political perspective, the underlying approach is grounded, often implic-
itly, in what Professor Munger refers to as the "ideology of legal liber-
alism." This is the view that law is an instrumental, formally rational,
and relatively autonomous system that maintains the social order by
resolving conflicts and reinforcing norms. Pursuant to the ideology of
legal liberalism, instrumentalized through the methods of doctrinal anal-
ysis, law is both central to and separate from other aspects of the social
order.
The second great tradition of contemporary legal scholarship is the
narrative/interpretive tradition-which is characteristic of such newer
approaches as critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, and critical
race theory. The narrative/interpretive tradition has undergone a meth-
odological evolution from self-reflection, through narrative, to empirical
and qualitative field research. By adding an experiential and self-reflec-
tive dimension to legal analysis, studies in the narrative/interpretive tra-
dition challenge the alleged objectivity and rationality of the law. They
show that how law is perceived, interpreted, experienced, and used de-
pends on the context and position of the individual. The law looks and
feels very different from the perspective of the power disadvantaged: It is
oppressive rather than expressive. Because much of the best work fo-
cuses on the experiences of lawyers, users, and victims of the law, the
narrative/interpretive tradition has been more successful in opening up
law and legal scholarship to diverse experiential perspectives and voices
than in challenging the centrality of law in the social order.
The deductive/analytical and narrative/interpretive traditions con-
verge on a point of unanimity. Both assert that the law occupies a
FOREWORD
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unique place on the axis of the social order: philosophically-through
the ideology of legal liberalism-and experientially-by incorporation of
the law into the self-images, egos, habits, and thought processes of
trained legal professionals. The problem with this self-perceived central-
ity, born of our contextualized epistemology, is that we are too apt to see
the mythical metaphysics of the law as an expression of how reality "is"
or "ought" to be. Paradoxically, the more the view of law's centrality is
perpetuated by its practitioners, the more marginal it may become, evolv-
ing into an alien system of sanctions and rules imposed upon the
unwilling.
13
III. THE INTERDISCIPLINES AND THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
How then do we pay heed to this warning and incorporate the in-
terdisciplines into the law school curriculum? Do we do what Professor
Lewis D. Solomon believes, perhaps prematurely, that some law schools
have already done: shift the educational focus from doctrinal analysis to
interdisciplinary analysis? 4 Or should we be chastened by the perennial
challenge that the interdisciplines have only a minimal place in legal
education?
"Isn't it true," goes the challenge, "that the job of law schools is to
train lawyers?" And, "Isn't the job of lawyers to do legal research and
analysis, to write contracts and briefs, to negotiate and litigate, and to
counsel their clients and represent them zealously within the bounds of
the law?" If law schools do not concentrate on the subjects and skills
that get and keep jobs for lawyers, so the argument goes, the "gap" be-
tween legal education and legal practice will continue to widen. 15 And if
law professors, in their own research, turn away from the study of law as
13. "By definition, the more external the legal system, the more any conflict introduced
into it or induced by it will take on meanings not originally relevant to the conflicting parties."
Robert L. Kidder, Toward an Integrated Theory of Imposed Law, in THE IMPOSITION OF LAW
289, 297 (Sandra B. Burman & Barbara E. Harrell-Bond eds., 1979).
14. Lewis D. Solomon, Perspectives on Curriculum Reform in Law Schools: A Critical
Assessment, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992).
15. The remarks of Professor Harry Wellington typify this perspective:
Few things are clear about legal education, but there is at least one feature of
our noble calling that is a truth universally acknowledged. As a group, law teachers
today are more academically oriented than they were 25 to 30 years ago. The con-
verse of this truth is that they are less professionally oriented. My colleagues today
care more about intellectual movements in faculties of arts and sciences than they
used to; they care less about the activities of the bar, and, perhaps, even the output of
the bench.
Harry H. Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The "Two Cultures" Phenomenon, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 327, 327 (1987).
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it has always been known, the gap between faculty and students will
widen, eviscerating the quality of legal education.16
The basis of legal education has traditionally been the progressive
refinement of a student's professional skills, honed through the successive
study of various substantive areas of law. A chronic tension exists re-
garding the proper mix of substantive courses, which merely set forth the
black letter law, with skills courses, which forge the linkages between
knowledge of the law and the exigencies of legal practice. Thus, those
concerned with upholding and improving the quality of legal practice
stress the importance of practical training in law schools. The report of
the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admis-
sions to the Bar, while acknowledging that the ostensible gap is actually a
continuum, recommends renewed emphasis on practice skills-such as
drafting, negotiation, and advocacy-core curricula, and values.17 "Val-
ues," as used in this context, means the ethics associated with the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct"8 and the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibilityl-those values that help lawyers to maintain individual ob-
jectivity and independence and to self-police legal practice, thus
preserving the bar's privileged status as a self-governing profession.20 In
this view of legal education, the development of those workaday virtues
that make lawyers different from nonlawyers, and the midrange theory
underlying daily law office decision making is given paramount impor-
tance. Other types of learning-those that seem to be peripheral to both
the work of substantive legal analysis and the business of legal training-
16. The gap between what law professors do and teach and what law students need to
learn to be practitioners is both a recurrent and misunderstood concern. See, e.g., THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCH. AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CON-
TINUUM (1992) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. "Legal educators and practicing lawyers should
stop viewing themselves as separated by a 'gap' and recognize that they are engaged in a com-
mon enterprise-the education and professional development of the members of a great pro-
fession." Id. at 3.
17. See id. at 135-221 (outlining and discussing "The Statement of Fundamental Lawyer-
ing Skills and Professional Values").
18. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
19. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
20. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 119-20.
[T]he legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of
self-government.
... If a single public profession of shared learning, skills and professional values
is to survive into the 21st century, the law schools ... must... work for the perpetu-
ation of core legal knowledge together with the fundamental lawyering skills and
professional values that identify a distinct profession of law throughout the United
States.
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are regarded as occupying some separate and discrete place in legal edu-
cation, even by those who consider them important.21
Familiar as this debate seems, it is driven by faulty dichotomies-
the unfortunate legacy of the Langdellian method-between lawyer
training and legal education and between professional education and
graduate school education. The chronological coincidence of the intro-
duction of the scientific/syllogistic method at Harvard Law School in the
1870s and the efforts, commenced several years later, by the organized
bar to improve and standardize legal education by making law school
attendance a prerequisite to bar admission and practice,22 led to the en-
shrinement of the casebook method as the paradigm of law school teach-
ing. The official demise of legal apprenticeship ended the participant-
observation method of legal education through which aspiring attorneys
learned the realities of the lives and needs of both clients and lawyers
while simultaneously learning legal doctrines and techniques.23 Further,
the decision to make law schools postgraduate institutions resulted in the
study of law being separated from the study of philosophy, political sci-
ence, economics, and other related subjects. Because the United States
differs in this respect from almost every other nation,24 American law
students do not absorb the law within an integrated intellectual matrix
the way our international colleagues do. Further, because the common-
law legal system is "common" only to those legal systems derived from
the English tradition, American law students also receive less training in
comparative and international law than do students in many civil law
countries.
Good as it may be for teaching legal analysis, the casebook/doctri-
nal method of legal education, even as it is now supplemented by other
linear and electronic materials, is chronically dissatisfying to both teach-
ers and students because it seems to be neither practical nor theoretical
21. For example, Dean John Sexton of New York University Law School, in a speech
enthusiastically explaining the changes in his school's curriculum, described the "situation
method" of teaching lawyering and the increase in interdisciplinary courses as two distinctly
different ways of complementing the casebook method. John Sexton, The Preconditions of
Professionalism: Legal Education for the Twenty-First Century: The Twelfth Blankenbaker
Lecture, 52 MONT. L. REv. 331, 341-42 (1991).
22. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 106.
23. I do not here advocate a return to the haphazard system of legal apprenticeship in
which those who sought to be attorneys were used as drones and "go-fers." But experiential
learning through real life agendas, personalities, and issues adds a dimension to understanding
that is irreplaceable. See Robert J. Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling" The Law School
Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 63-77 (1986) (advocating fieldwork im-
mersion of clinical training in law firms coupled with critical tutorials with clinical professors
as superior to law school based clinics).
24. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 4.
[Vol. 27:9
November 1993]
enough.25 Wedging its midlevel analyses between the practical and intel-
lectual experiences of the law, the casebook method artificially juxtaposes
them. Casebooks and doctrinal study of the substantive law continue to
be treated as the kernel of legal education. A more realistic metaphor for
the casebook method would be to think of it as a kind of educational
white bread-a standardized solution for efficiently meeting the mini-
mum nutritional standards of developing lawyers. Because we have met
the requirements of mass mental feeding by purging legal education of
the visceral experiences apprentices receive and the abstract theoretical
mastication graduate students must do, we are forever faced with the
task of restoring them.
The pressure to do so has always been there. As late as 1950, half of
the practicing attorneys in the United States were not law school gradu-
ates. By 1935 Harvard law students were actively protesting against the
casebook method and the "blandness" of the law school generally.26 As
early as 1928, Columbia Law School published a report entitled Sum-
mary of Studies in Legal Education by the Faculty of Law of Columbia
University, which chronicled the work of ten faculty committees that had
labored for two years studying the school's curriculum.27 The report rec-
ommended restructuring the entire curriculum "along functional lines,"
according to a social engineering type of law and society program.28 A
similar self-study in 1988 resulted in the revamping of the Columbia first-
year curriculum to include the courses Introductory Law and Economics
and Perspectives on Contemporary Legal Thought2 9-thus illustrating
that the current "law and . . ." movement is merely the contemporary
permutation of the ongoing effort to provide full educational nutrition to
law students.
Interdisciplinary nourishment vitally engages students in the contin-
uous reconceptualization of the relationships among themselves, the pro-
fession, the law, its users, and the broader social and moral order.
Virtually all the authors in this collection confront the problem of the
appropriate legal texture for an increasingly pluralistic society. Law and
25. See Robert S. Summers, Fuller on Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 8, 15 (1984).
26. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s
TO THE 1980s 137 (1983).
27. Id. at 137-38.
28. Id.
29. Solomon, supra note 14, at 7-8. The "Perspectives" course, replacing the required
second-year selection of either Legal History, Jurisprudence, or Comparative Law, was
"designed to help students explore the major historical and philosophical influences on modem
legal ideas and institutions-legal realism, critical legal studies, law and justice, law and eco-
nomics, critical race theory and feminist legal theory." Id. at 8.
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sociology, anthropology, feminism, and bioethics facilitate the experi-
ence, understanding, and incorporation of the many contextualized
microlegal cultures of the users and nonusers of the formal law. The
methods of these disciplines, integrated into the practice of law, can fire
the search for solutions that "work by the light of local knowledge."30
Law and philosophy and law and religion force students to struggle on a
macrolevel with issues of diversity and the social order. Do we protect
diversity by expanding protections for individual freedom and choice, as
Professor Francis's Essay suggests, or do we forge a more wide-reaching
moral consensus as Professor Rainey's contribution recommends?3"
The interdisciplines also sharpen the craft of practice. As the Essays
by Professors Reid, Tiersma, and Weisberg illustrate, lawyers can learn
much about the strategic use of history, words, syntax, and discourse by
employing the methods and insights of history, linguistics, and the
humanities.
On another level, the interdisciplines can play a significant role in
rendering the inner dialogue between lawyers and the law more critical
and less egoistic. Professor Weisberg provides a hair-raising description
of the Vichy lawyers throwing themselves into the technicalities of the
anti-Semitic laws.32 This exemplifies the dangers that may result from a
narrow technocratic sense of one's professional identity in which legal
doctrine and ethics narrowly defined are divorced from more basic social
and moral issues. Although Professor Weisberg's example is extreme, a
legal education that largely divorces the study of law from the study of
other subjects and simultaneously resocializes lawyers into a thoroughgo-
ing professional identity raises real dangers that attorneys may "split"
their professional selves from their human selves,3 3 and be lured into un-
reflective complacence and compliance.
30. By this phrase, Clifford Geertz refers to the customs, values, world views, practices,
traditions, and understandings of the people who use the law. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 170-71 (1983). To be
relevant, law must incorporate local knowledge.
31. See R. Randall Rainey, S.J., Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?, 27
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 147 (1993).
32. See Richard H. Weisberg, Three Lessons from Law and Literature, 27 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 285 (1993).
33. Mental "splitting" or "doubling" through intensive socialization into a seemingly in-
ternally logically consistent system without external critique enabled, for example, Nazi doc-
tors to commit atrocities in spite of their Hippocratic oaths. See ROBERT J. LIFTON, THE
NAzi DocTORS (1986).
For a discussion of the difficulties and possibilities of reintegrating the professional and
moral selves, see Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Con-
struction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577 (1993). Comments on Levinson's
article may be found in Jerome Homblass, The Jewish Lawyer, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639
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The task of the interdisciplines in the law school curriculum is, in
part, to enable students to construct legal identities that incorporate their
emotional, intellectual, and moral identities. It is also to teach them how
to use this holistic perspective in their later practices. How then should
interdisciplinary nutrition be incorporated into the law school curricu-
lum? If we continue to think of Langdellian white bread as the proper
basic food for law students, it makes sense to think of interdisciplinarity
in dosage form. What should be the Recommended Daily Allowances of
the interdisciplines for maximally efficient student nutrition? Should
they be given like vitamins, in small daily dosages in substantive classes?
As required but separate courses in the first-year curriculum? Or, like
powerful medicines, in specialized seminars to cure the burnout of the
second half of law school?
Perhaps there is a better approach: to reconceptualize legal educa-
tion on a whole-grain model and locate doctrinal and skills instruction
within the nutritive medium of greater experiences and ideas. If interdis-
ciplinarity is to be pervasive, are there no limits other than the predilec-
tions of law professors? If the goal is whole-grain nourishment, how are
we to separate the wheat from the chaff? The real nourishment from the
puff pastry? I would agree with Professor Wellington that the test of
nutritional value is ultimately relevancy, broadly defined. 4 Law is ulti-
mately a purposive and judgmental discipline, laying down real rules for
real people and solving real conflicts with consequences in real time.
Curricula, like scholarship, should be responsive to this consideration.
There are many possible ways to define relevancy. One possible way
is to eliminate what seems exotic or arcane. But this is an unsatisfactory
approach, because what seems exotic may be very close to home. In my
own Law and Anthropology class, for example, students consider some
seemingly exotic materials-a mediation by the !Kung San in the
Kalahari Desert over a dispute between two men claiming ownership of a
hunted animal and a criminal trial in the People's Republic of China,
which looks to Western eyes like a moral confessional. Yet such materi-
als are excellent teaching tools for such closer-to-home jurisprudential
issues as the balance of individual rights and communitarian responsibili-
ties and such practice-oriented considerations as the respective roles of
mediation, arbitration, and trial.
A second test for relevancy might be integratability: Either elimi-
nate-or relegate to tiny seminars-whatever does not seem to naturally
(1993), and Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash on
Levinson, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613 (1993).
34. See Wellington, supra note 15, at 329-30.
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integrate into a more mainstream substantive law class. But the integra-
tion test also fails because the ease of integration is usually a matter of
energy and effort. As the Essays by Professors Sanger and Tiersma illus-
trate, feminism and linguistics can open up horizons for students in an
ordinary contracts or criminal law class.35
Problem focus is a third possible test. Under this test, interdiscipli-
nary materials should only be used if they help answer problems posed
by the law.36 But this test is also unsatisfactory because it frustrates the
possible creative contributions of the interdisciplines by making them
subservient to existing legal paradigms. The review of research on every-
day users of the law by Professor Munger and Professors Conley and
O'Barr and the discussion of feminist method by Professor Sanger illus-
trate that the interdisciplines are often most influential when they suc-
ceed in rendering visible and significant that which has been previously
hidden or ignored by the formal law.
Relevancy to practice is a fourth possible test. But it, too, ultimately
gives way as reflecting a false dichotomy. Again, my own Law and An-
thropology class can serve as an illustration since it is one which, at first
glance, seems to be remote from teaching practice skills. In the class,
each student is required to produce an ethnography focused on conflict,
negotiation, or dispute settlement in some definable group or context-
ethnic, interest, or community-based-on the basis of participant obser-
vation conducted during the course of the semester.
The fieldwork-based ethnography has, inter alia, some specific prac-
tice-related values. It enables the students to appreciate the multiple
contexts and cultures in which law is used and made, thereby sensitizing
them to the people they may encounter in practice. Second, it trains
them to use ethnographic research methods investigatively and to obtain
a contextualized understanding of clients and cases in an in-depth way
not possible through such standard methods as client interviewing and
discovery. In the usual skills class or training, students learn to translate
facts given by clients into legal categories and arguments. The result is
often to think that the legal categories are primary or objective-and that
other information is noise. Through ethnographic research the students
35. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 3
(1988), and Mary I. Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, orA Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to
a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988), provide other examples of how
feminism can be incorporated into the most basic law school subjects.
36. Cf Jean G. Zorn, Lawyers, Anthropologists, and the Study of Law: Encounters in the
New Guinea Highlands, 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 271 (1990) (demonstrating that anthropolo-
gists and legal scholars have not been as useful to each other as they might have been because
they do not ask same questions).
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learn how legal culture and client culture mutually construct each other
and how to develop the legal imagination to translate the needs of clients
into law.
The flip side of such fieldwork-based ethnographic research is the
three-year "lawyering track" recently introduced at New York Univer-
sity School of Law. Beginning with a series of simulations, the lawyering
exercises combine the methods of the social sciences and the humanities.
Students gain a holistic perspective of lawyers' roles and obligations, and
learn to critically craft strategies for helping clients through the use of
the methods of ethnography, participant observation, and literary criti-
cism. 37 The practice component proceeds in conjunction with an ongo-
ing research focus on "lawyering," which draws heavily on the
interdisciplines3 8
Exotica, integratability, problem focus, and practice relationship all
seem poor candidates for being the bright line rule to determine the test
of relevancy for the interdisciplines. I recommend a test that is both
more intuitive and more flexible. It is a test that balances the seemingly
contradictory concerns of decentralizing the law and rendering the in-
terdisciplines relevant to it.
Relevancy, as I use it here, is reciprocal. Not only should the in-
terdisciplines be relevant to the law but the law must be relevant to the
subjects of the interdisciplines-the everyday users of the law and the
broader social, moral, and economic order. It is the job of the interdis-
ciplines to persistently call the law to task and demand that it be respon-
sive. It is when the law and the insights revealed by the interdisciplines
are palpably incongruent that the interdisciplines are most useful, both in
revealing what is not working and in suggesting how it might be made to
work. The test of relevancy I would recommend is, therefore, the test of
the "Ouch!" and the "Ah ha!": the first for the critique that exposes the
illusion and the second for the work that inspires the solution. The
merely interesting, or "Ho hum," I would avoid.
37. Sexton, supra note 21, at 331.
38. Peggy C. Davis, Law and Lawyering: Legal Studies with an Interactive Focus, 37
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185 (1992) (studying tradition of contextual criticism, "done with the
New York University Lawyering Theory Colloquium, an interdisciplinary collaboration of stu-
dents and faculty interested in the analysis of lawyering as a means to a deeper understanding
of law"). Other law schools have also integrated substantive skills and critical learning. City
University of New York School of Law at Queens College, which focuses on preparing stu-
dents for public interest and inner city legal practice, has used a total immersion first year
simulation involving an administrative hearing. In their respective relatively rural states, Ver-
mont Law School and the University of Montana School of Law have used "law firm simula-
tions" to prepare students for small to mid-size law firm practice.
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The authors in this collection have much in them of "Ouch!" and
"Ah ha!" We hope that readers who have previously been hesitant to do
so will adopt interdisciplinarity not merely as a sidelight to erudite schol-
arship but as a habit of mind-a habit of mind that becomes part of their
professional self-identity and informs their approach to all areas of legal
scholarship, teaching, and practice. The law has been described as a
seamless web. Hopefully, by exploring the working relationship between
law and the other disciplines, we will come to see this web as being com-
prised of many diverse strands-each of us weaving our own.
